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A FEW LITTLE ISSUES FOR THE HAGUE
JUDGMENTS NEGOTIATIONS
Patrick J. Borchers*
INTRODUCTION
In June 1996 I had the pleasure of attending, as a Record-
ing Secretary, the Hague Conference's second Special Commis-
sion on the recognition and enforcement of judgments. Al-
though some of what I say here is drawn from my observations
of the Special Commission, my comments are not an official
statement of either the Hague Conference or the United States
delegation. My purpose here is to identify some of the more
difficult issues likely to present themselves during the nego-
tiations.
Ultimately, I believe that it will be difficult-though not
impossible-to negotiate a convention acceptable to the United
States and the other members of the Hague Conference. How-
ever, in my judgment, the difficulty of the task does not coun-
sel its abandonment. Even admitting the possibility that the
project will prove unsuccessful, the large potential benefits still
make it worth grasping at the gold ring.
I. ISSUE No. 1: Do THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE HAGUE
CONFERENCE HAVE SUFFICIENT INCENTIVE TO BARGAIN?
By international standards, United States recognition of
foreign judgments is extremely liberal. Although U.S. courts
once demanded reciprocity,' nowadays it is not generally a
requirement for foreign recognition.2 Rather, U.S. courts re-
quire simply that the foreign proceedings be conducted in a
generally fair manner, and that the judgment be unaffected by
fraud, a lack of jurisdiction or some other well-established
ground for collateral attack.3 As a practical matter, a huge
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Albany Law
School of Union University.
1. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 210 (1895).
2. See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the
United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 253, 287 (1991).
3. See, e.g., Petition of Breau, 565 A.2d 1044, 1049 (N.H. 1989) (Souter, J.)
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fraction of judgments rendered by Hague member states quali-
fy for recognition in the United States.
By contrast, it is much more difficult to obtain recognition
of a U.S. judgment in most foreign nations. Although there is
some movement towards liberalization,4 concerns over large
damage awards, punitive and multiple damages, jury trials
and a general suspicion of our legal system5 have led to any
number of foreign devices for denying effect to U.S. judg-
ments.
6
So, if one considers only the number of judgments likely to
be affected by a Hague Judgments Convention, the United
States stands to gain disproportionately. This is not to say,
however, that the United States is entirely without leverage.
The enormous dimensions of the U.S. economy mean that a
huge number of potential foreign judgment debtors have assets
in the United States and are subject to enforcement without
the need to present the judgment for recognition abroad. Con-
tacts-based general jurisdiction-a doctrine much broader in
scope than its European counterparts 7-- makes many foreign
entities amenable to in personam jurisdiction on the basis of
unrelated U.S. business activities.8 Equally dubious principles
of general jurisdiction-including the time-worn favorite of tag
jurisdiction'-put foreign defendants at risk for assertions of
jurisdiction that are unreasonable by international stan-
(Canadian judgments are generally entitled to enforcement in U.S. courts).
4. See, e.g., Peter Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American Money
Judgments in Germany-The 1992 Decision of the German Supreme Court, 40 AM.
J. COMP. L. 729 (1992); but see Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceability of American
Money Judgments Abroad: A Landmark Decision by the German Federal Court of
Justice, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 641, 658-59 (1992) (arguing that case may
not lead to significantly liberalized recognition).
5. Exacerbated, I fear, by the broadcasting of People v. Simpson, No.
BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995), and the morbid fascination that case drew here
and abroad.
6. See generally MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE:
A GUIDE THROUGH THE JUNGLE (1995).
7. See Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United
States and European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP.
L. 121, 133-37 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Bryant v. Finnish Nat-l Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1965)
(small office in New York sufficient for jurisdiction in that state in an action to
recover for injuries suffered in Paris, France).
9. Dating back in the United States at least to Barrell v. Benjamin, 15
Mass. 354, 358 (1819) and more recently confirmed in Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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dards. °
Thus, the main U.S. bargaining chip is to offer more pre-
dictable and narrow jurisdictional grounds. If a convention
were, for instance, to allow for general jurisdiction over busi-
ness entities only at their place of registration or principal
offices and over individuals only at their habitual residence,
11
this would considerably diminish the risk of marginal jurisdic-
tional assertions and subsequent enforcement proceedings. It
remains to be seen, however, whether this is a big enough
carrot to entice other member nations.
II. IssuE No. 2: DoEs THE U.S. HAVE SUFFICIENT INCENTIVE
TO BARGAIN?
Just as the other members of the Hague Conference might
not be intensely interested in dealing, it is worth considering
whether the United States has enough to gain to make the
changes likely to be necessary to reach consensus. In one
sense, of course, the current U.S. position is undesirable be-
cause of the difficulty of enforcing our judgments abroad. How-
ever, the New York Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 2 and increasing accep-
tance of arbitration agreements even in public law areas,1
3
mean that many potential litigants can avoid the judicial pro-
cess altogether.
Of course, not all potential litigants can avoid court. Tort
10. The Permanent Bureau's report lists both service of the summons while
the defendant is temporarily in the forum and the mere "doing" of business in the
forum as potentially "exorbitant" bases of jurisdiction that might be specifically en-
joined by the Convention. See CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, INTERNATIONAL JURISDIC-
TION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS 80-82 (Hague
Conference on Private InVl Law, Prel. Doc. No. 7, Apr. 1997) [hereinafter
KESSEDJIAN REPORT].
11. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTIL LAW, PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF
THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION CONCERNING THE PROPOSED CONVENTION
ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMER-
CIAL MATTERS §§ 3.1.1.-3.1.2, at 5 (Info. Doc., Sept. 1997) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
RESULTS].
12. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force
with respect to the United States Dec. 29, 1970) [hereinafter New York Arbitration
Convention].
13. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985) (international antitrust dispute is the appropriate subject of arbi-
tration).
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plaintiffs, for instance, usually cannot practically enter into
pre-dispute arbitration agreements and strongly prefer judicial
fora. However, this is precisely where foreign suspicion of the
U.S. judicial system runs deepest. Strict products liability,
punitive damages, multi-year discovery, and well-publicized
multi-million and multi-billion dollar jury verdicts all contrib-
ute to a great deal of foreign uneasiness about U.S. judgments.
Further, the interest groups that may have the most to gain by
a convention are not ones whose political influence is on the
rise, as the successful drives for "tort reform" in state legisla-
ture after state legislature attest.
14
The concessions that the United States will have to make
may be so large in relation to the benefit to domestic interests
as to doom the possibilities of ratification. In short, it may be
that a convention acceptable to the other members of the
Hague Conference cannot be ratified, and a convention that
the United States would ratify may not be acceptable to the
other members.
III. IsSUE No. 3: WHAT ABOUT INCONSISTENCIES WITH UNITED
STATES JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS?
There is no realistic possibility that a convention will re-
semble the "minimum contacts" test15 that dominates U.S.
jurisdiction. The wild unpredictability of, and enormous vol-
ume of litigation generated by, this jurisdictional test are well
documented. 6 The other members of the Hague Conference
will have no desire to subject themselves to such a messy stan-
dard.'7
Provisions in a convention that narrow jurisdiction over
foreign parties would be unproblematic. A ratified convention
would be the "[Slupreme Law of the Land"8 and preempt
14. See, e.g., Paul Burke & Patricia Kilday Hart, The Best and the Worst
Legislators 1997, TEX MONTHLY, July 1997, at 90 (discussing in part the previous
session's passage of tort reform legislation).
15. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
16. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1027 (1995); Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Ju-
risdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531 (1995).
17. I clearly recall, for instance, a member of the British delegation describing
the minimum contacts test as "rather diffuse," which is perhaps the most diplo-
matic assessment one could make.
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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inconsistent state standards. 9
The more interesting problem would arise if the conven-
tion were, in some circumstances, to allow for broader jurisdic-
tion than allowed for under the minimum contacts test. For
instance, in tort cases the Brussels and Lugano conventions
allow for jurisdiction in "the place where the harmful event oc-
curred."0 It seems very likely that other delegations at the
Hague will press for a similar tort standard, or at least one
that is equally predictable.2'
The two most prominent U.S. cases on tort jurisdiction,
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson22 and Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court,' forbid jurisdiction in the
injury state in some cases. Thus, if the convention were to
adopt a Brussels-style rule, and it were to be ratified by the
United States, it would require U.S. courts to depart from the
World-Wide/Asahi line of cases in order to honor the conven-
tion. Whether U.S. courts would then follow the convention or
the World-Wide/Asahi line of cases is an interesting ques-
tion.' In my view, there are excellent reasons for a U.S. court
19. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143
(1980) (treaties preempt inconsistent state laws).
20. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial -Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, art. 5(3), 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter
Brussels Convention] (for the consolidated, current text of this convention see 1990
O.J. (C 189) 2, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413); Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, art.
5(3), 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, 10, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620, 624 (popularly known as
the Lugano Convention); see also Borchers, supra note 7, at 144-45.
21. Interestingly, the preliminary report drawn up by the Permanent Bureau
of the Hague Conference suggests that Article (5)(3) of the Brussels Convention is
problematic because it allows for "concurrent jurisdiction" in too many cases. See
KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 10, at 70; see also Brussels Convention, supra
note 20, art. 5(3). The proposed solution, however, is a presumptive rule of juris-
diction in the victim's domicile, a standard that would conflict with the minimum
contacts test in more cases than the Brussels standard. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT,
supra note 10, at 70-72.
22. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
23. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
24. The problem would not necessarily be limited to tort cases. For instance,
international conventions on child support generally allow for jurisdiction in the
child's domicile or habitual residence. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations Towards
Children, Apr. 15, 1958, 539 U.N.T.S. 27. The Permanent Bureau's report, not
surprisingly, seems to favor this jurisdictional rule in a Hague Judgments Conven-
tion. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 10, at 76. However, the minimum con-
tacts test forbids jurisdiction in the child's home state, at least in some cases. See,
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to follow a convention rather than existing minimum contacts
precedent.' But, of course, the problem has not been resolved
by the Supreme Court, which places the U.S. delegation in a
somewhat uncertain position.26 Complete confidence that U.S.
courts would fully enforce a ratified convention would either
require the U.S. delegation to negotiate for convention provi-
sions that are entirely consistent with the minimum contacts
test-probably an impossible task--or hope that a general
escape provision-perhaps under the rubric of ordre pub-
ict7-- will solve the problem. In any event, the chaotic state of
U.S. jurisdiction is likely to prove problematic either in the
negotiations, ratification battle, or implementation of a conven-
tion.
IV. IssUE No. 4: WHAT ABOUT "EXCESSIVE" DAMAGES?
There can be little doubt that the propensity of the U.S.
legal system to award damages considerably in excess of those
usually awarded by other systems is now, and will be, the
source of much concern in the negotiations." Moreover, cer-
tain types of damages-notably tort punitive damages and
statutory multiple damages such as those provided for by the
anti-trust laws-are enormously unpopular abroad."
e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
25. The upcoming program of the Conflict of Laws Section of the Association
of American Law Schools will examine this question. Papers will be published in
the ALBANY LAW REVIEW. For an encouraging sign that jurisdiction in internation-
al cases may be subject to a more flexible test, see Republic of Panama v. BCCI
Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997) (under Fifth Amend-
ment due process standards, jurisdiction exists as long as the defendant has con-
tacts with the United States as a whole and the choice of forum is not severely
inconvenient).
26. Professor von Mehren has noted the problem, and expressed some concern
regarding the ability of a convention to extend beyond jurisdictional limits current-
ly articulated by the Supreme Court. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57
LAW & CONTEmP. PROBS. 271, 281 (1994).
27. Cf New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 12, art. V(2)(b), 21
U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42 (recognition of an arbitral award may be de-
nied if a court finds that "[tihe recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to ... public policy .... ").
28. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 10, at 106.
29. See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] App. Cas. 1129 (H.L.) (restricting punitive
damages in English cases to unusual circumstances); Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (U.K.) (giving judgment debtors in Sherman Act cases a
civil cause of action for two-thirds of the judgment; popularly known as the
162 [Vol. XXIV:.I
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One possible partial answer would be to exclude punitive
and multiple damages from the scope of the convention alto-
gether.0 This would leave the (punitive) judgment creditor to
the mercy of foreign courts and-as a practical matter-make
it extremely difficult to enforce the punitive portion of the
judgment abroad."' It seems clear that some exception like
this will have to be made for punitive damages, because it is
impossible to imagine other member states agreeing to enforce
such judgments without re-examination. 2
The more interesting question is whether exclusion of
punitive and multiple damages will be enough to satisfy other
member nations. Large pain and suffering awards may well be
seen as "excessive" by other nations, but-unlike punitive
damages-are difficult to exclude categorically." The failed
efforts at a bilateral treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom included a late-inserted Article 8A, which
would have allowed the recognizing courts to enforce a judg-
ment in a lesser amount if the judgment debtor could establish
"that the amount awarded by the court of origin is greatly in
excess of the amount, including costs, that would have been
awarded.., in the court of origin .... ."' Even this far-reach-
ing provision was not enough to allay the concerns of the Brit-
ish insurance industry, causing a breakdown in negotia-
tions.35 If this obstacle prevented the more modest project of
concluding a bilateral agreement with a nation with which we
share a language and the common law heritage, it seems safe
to say it will be a major issue in negotiations with forty or so
"Clawback Act").
30. Cf. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 10, at 108.
31. See generally Hay, supra note 4 (discussing German case refusing to recog-
nize the punitive portion of a tort judgment).
32. For instance, the draft U.K-U.S. bilateral treaty did not apply to judg-
ments "to the extent that they are for punitive or multiple damages." Convention
on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters,
initialed Oct. 26, 1976, U.S.-U.K., art. 2(2)(b), 16 I.L.M. 71, 73 [hereinafter U.S.-
U.K Convention]; see also von Mehren, supra note 26, at 274.
33. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 10, at 106.
34. David Luther Woodward, Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Civil
Judgments in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Economic
Community, 8 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 299, 327 (1983) (Appendix containing
revisions to the U.S.-U.K. Convention, supra note 32, which were proposed in
negotiations that began on September 18, 1978).
35. See von Mehren, supra note 26, at 294.
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nations, most of which are not of the common law heritage.
The Permanent Bureau's report recognizes exactly this prob-
lem, and suggests either that "excessive" damages be defined
in terms of the sorts of risks generally insurable in the state of
the recognizing court or the use of a provision like Article 8A.
Even assuming that a provision like Article 8A is enough
to soothe the anxieties of the other member states, there re-
mains the question of whether this would leave anything
worth ratifying from the U.S. perspective. Discussing Article
8A in the context of the upcoming Hague negotiations, one
U.S. commentator urged that the notion of such damages-only
revision be "discarded permanently."36 Perhaps it should. But,
if something like Article 8A is viewed as both too great and too
small a concession it becomes difficult to see where the com-
mon ground lies.
V. OTHER ISSUES
There are many other issues likely to require extensive
attention, though they are of less fundamental importance
than those mentioned above. One is the much debated question
of whether the convention should be of the "double" or "mixed"
variety. The United States proposal for a mixed conven-
tion-which would allow for a "grey" zone of jurisdictional
bases that are not forbidden but also do not require foreign
recognition-appears to be the most sensible given the other
difficult negotiating problems.37 However, perhaps because of
European familiarity with Brussels and Lugano, the current
preference among the Hague member nations is for a strict
double convention.38 A double convention may well be an un-
realistic expectation and-cognizant of this-the Permanent
Bureau's report suggests that it may be only a starting point in
the negotiations."
Another formidable issue is the large number of "specialty"
36. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a Multinational Judgments Conven-
tion: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 289, 294
(1994).
37. See generally von Mehren, supra note 26 (discussing advantages of a
mixed convention).
38. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 10, at 86-88.
39. Confirmation of this appears in PRELIMINARY RESULTS, supra note 11,
§ 2.2, at 3 ("[It is not certain that ... [a purely double] convention is attain-
able.").
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areas that might conceivably be excluded from the convention's
scope. The Permanent Bureau's report states that it is "settled"
that the status of natural persons, marital property, wills,
succession of the estates of deceased persons, bankruptcy and
social security will all be excluded from the scope of the con-
vention.40 The Permanent Bureau's report also mentions
maintenance (i.e., support) obligations, complex (especially
environmental) torts, competition law, civil fines and customs
duties and intellectual property matters as possible exclu-
sions.4 1 As a practical matter, consensus may often be reached
more easily by excluding controversial areas. If, however, the
exclusions become too numerous, any convention will be de-
prived of a good deal of its usefulness.
The general difference in legal philosophy between civil
and common law nations is also likely to manifest itself pecu-
liarly in a judgments convention.42 One practical difficulty is
likely be the question of whether the new convention should
include provisions for discretionary declination of jurisdiction
in the nature of forum non conveniens.3 Demonstrating great-
er comfort with the idea of judicial discretion, the common law
countries seem to favor the doctrine; demonstrating greater
suspicion of the idea of judicial discretion, the civil law coun-
tries seem to oppose it.
Certainly, none of these-nor dozens of other-issues are
insurmountable. But, it seems very likely that they will cause
difficulty in the negotiations, even assuming the most funda-
mental obstacles can be overcome.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. position on this matter is a difficult one. The
United States has a poor record of ratifying Hague conventions
specifically, and private law conventions generally. Successful
40. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 10, at 16-18.
41. Id. at 18-28.
42. For an excellent discussion of the differences between the two systems and
the difficulties associated with attempting to have both traditions co-exist in one
state, see Catherine Valcke, Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Federalism, 21 YALE
J. INT'L L. 67 (1996).
43. For a worldwide study of this doctrine, see J.J. FAWCETr, DECLINING JU-
RISDICTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995). It is somewhat simplified to
describe the doctrine as only a creature of the common law, as some civil jurisdic-
tions allow it in some form.
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negotiations will require the overcoming of deeply held suspi-
cions of the U.S. legal system. But, the Hague negotiations
represent an enormous opportunity. A satisfactory judgments
convention would be a giant step toward a more closely inte-
grated world-wide legal system in which the goal of access to
justice and fairness to litigants without regard to international
boundaries could come much closer to realization.
